Explanatory Mechanisms: The

Contribution of Critical Realism and

Systems Thinking/Cybernetics by Mingers, John
 1 
 
            
                
                    Working Paper Series   
 










Explanatory Mechanisms: The 
Contribution of Critical Realism and 
Systems Thinking/Cybernetics  
 
John Mingers  






























Working Paper No. 241  
February 2011  
ISSN 1748-7595 (Online) 
 2 
 
Explanatory mechanisms: The contribution of critical 











In recent years the philosophy of science has been moving from the traditional deductive-
nomological, covering law model of explanation towards one centred on the key concept of 
explanatory mechanisms. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of 
mechanistic explanation by bringing in theoretical ideas from two traditions which have had 
the idea of mechanisms at their core for many years. These are the philosophy of science 
known as critical realism and the discipline of systems thinking/cybernetics. After briefly 
outlining their respective literatures, this paper will cover issues such as: ontic versus 
epistemological explanations; generative causality; non-physical mechanisms including 
social and cognitive structures; functionalist explanation; localisation; and absences and 
omissions as causes.    
 




For many decades, the concept of explanation within the philosophy of science was presumed 
to revolve around the idea of universal laws. Events were to be “explained” in terms of being 
instances deduced from general covering laws, which were themselves developed through 
some form of induction from observable empirical examples. This was formalised in what 
became known as the deductive-nomological (D-N) model developed by Hempel (1965). 
However, in more recent years the limitations of this approach have become ever more 
obvious and an alternative has been generating much interest and support. This approach 
eschews universal laws in favour of particular “mechanisms” that causally generate the 
phenomena of interest to the scientist (Gerring 2007, Glennan 1996, Glennan 2002, 
Machamer 2004, Machamer, et al. 2000, Salmon 1998b, Symons 2008). Apart from avoiding 
many of the problems besetting the D-N model, especially concerning induction, the idea of 
mechanisms fits much better with the actual practices of scientists (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
2005) and, as we shall see, with explanations in everyday life. 
As might be expected with a major new development, there are many issues to be debated, 
and indeed arguments about how the term mechanism should be conceptualised. The purpose 
of the paper is to contribute to the understanding of mechanistic explanations by bringing in 
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theoretical ideas from two domains that are highly relevant to this approach, and yet have so 
far been little discussed. These domains are those of systems thinking and cybernetics, and 
the philosophy of critical realism. The former is an obvious choice. Many of the papers on 
mechanistic explanation explicitly couch their models in terms of complex systems in which 
a variety of component parts interact with each other to form a mechanism that then has 
particular behavioural or emergent properties. However, they tend to make no reference to 
the huge literature on systems thinking and cybernetics that developed, originally in biology, 
ecology, and information science, from the 1920’s onwards. This provides a strong body of 
conceptual and theoretical work on which the mechanistic viewpoint can be built. 
Less well known, perhaps, is the philosophical approach called critical realism (CR) that has 
been developing as an alternative to both positivism and interpretivism (in social science) 
since the 1970’s (Archer, et al. 1998, Bhaskar 1978, Bhaskar 1979, Bhaskar 1993). This is a 
comprehensive and sophisticated post-positivist paradigm that has at its heart the idea of 
generative causality via causal structures or mechanisms which possess powers or tendencies 
to behave in particular ways. The actual and empirical events that occur in the world are then 
seen as resulting from the interactions and interplay of these structures and mechanisms. We 
will show that many of the issues and problems of the mechanistic view of causation have 
already been encountered, and to some extent addressed, within critical realism. We should 
also note that CR itself uses many systemic and holistic concepts (Mingers 2011). 
The approach of this paper is firstly to outline briefly the literature of critical realism and 
systems thinking. It then goes on to consider a range of issues and debates about mechanistic 
explanation, giving an indication, in each case, of the contribution that systems thinking and 
critical realism can make to our understanding of the issue. 
Deduction, induction and abduction: the logic of mechanistic explanation in 
critical realism 
Our starting point in explaining critical realism’s view of mechanisms is actually the work of 
the pragmatist philosopher C. S. Peirce (1931-1958). One of Peirce’s many contributions was 
the development of the logic of “abduction” or “retroduction” as opposed to deduction or 
induction (Psillos 2009).   
Consider the following syllogism (an example from Peirce 2.6231) 
General law:    All beans in this bag are white 
Particular case:   All these beans come from this bag 
Conclusion:   All these beans are white 
 
This syllogism, which can be classified as AAA-1 (Barbara) is valid and is an example of 
deductive inference. Given a general law or rule we can deduce a particular consequence 
from it.  
This can be re-arranged as follows: 
                                                 
1 References to Peirce’s Collected Works are in the form (vol.para) 
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Context:    All these beans come from this bag 
Empirical observations: All these beans are white 
General law:    All beans in this bag are white 
 
This syllogism can be said to capture the logic of induction – from particular instances we 
induce a general conclusion. In terms of pure logic it is invalid since there could still be beans 
in the bag that are not white but were not selected, but it obviously has utility as a practical 
mode of inference. 
It can also be re-arranged as follows: 
(Unexpected) observation: All these beans are white 
Possible cause:   All beans in this bag are white 
Explanatory hypothesis:  All these beans come from this bag 
 
This syllogism is also not valid in a logical sense – some other reason could explain why all 
the beans are white – but it has quite a different character from the previous two. Peirce 
called it “abduction” or “retroduction”.  In his 5th Lecture on Pragmatism, Peirce said,  
“Abduction consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them” (5.145) and in 
the 6th Lecture, he said “abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis” 
(5.171). So, with the process of abduction we begin with some particular occurrence or event, 
usually one that is unexpected or does not conform to current theories; and we then take an 
imaginative leap to think of some theory or explanation which might account for the event. 
This is neither an induction from the examples nor a deduction from the rule, but rather an 
explanatory or exploratory hypothesis as to why the situation might have occurred.  
Abduction is the point where novelty, innovation and creativity enter the scientific method, as 
indeed they must. With deduction, we get nothing more than the consequences of the 
premises – but where did they come from? With induction, we just get a generalisation form 
the observations we have made – but how do we know they are all that matters? However, 
with abduction we get explanation and the possibility of new knowledge. 
Peirce (2.781) recognised that actually all three modes were necessary for successful science. 
We begin with an unusual or puzzling phenomenon (C) and try to hypothesise something (A) 
which would account for the existence of the phenomenon, this is abduction. Then, second, 
we explore the consequences of A. If A is in fact the case, what other consequences would 
follow that we might be able to observe or test? This is deduction. Finally, we try and observe 
whether these consequences do in fact happen, which would thus confirm our explanation. 
This is a form of induction. 
This mode of reasoning is also at the heart of critical realism (CR), which adopts an approach 
to causality that is known as “generative causality” (Mingers 2000). In distinction to 
positivism or empiricism, which adopts the impoverished Humean version of causality as 
nothing more than a constant conjunction of events, CR holds that there is a stratified external 
reality in which the occurrences and events we experience (the “actual”) are the result of, or 
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generated by, the interaction of underlying structures and mechanisms (the “real”). These 
mechanisms may be physical, social or conceptual, and they may be observable or 
unobservable. CR’s methodology (DREI), which is involves retroduction, is very much along 
the lines of Peirce’s abduction (Hartwig, 2007, p. 195): 
(D) An unusual occurrence or anomaly is observed and Described   
(R) Retroduction is applied – putative causal mechanism(s) are hypothesised which, if 
they existed, would account for the occurrence or anomaly  
(E) Hypotheses are Eliminated where possible 
(I) The correct mechanism is Identified  
The main difference with Peirce is that the account is couched in terms of mechanisms and 
structures that have causal powers or tendencies to bring about changes in the world. Bhaskar 
does not explicitly define what he means by mechanism, and sometimes he refers to them as 
structures, but they can be characterised by the following:  
• Mechanisms exist in a real, ontological sense independently of how they may be known 
or described by observers. They are stratified, in the sense of depth or hierarchy, and they 
may be physical, social, or conceptual. They may be observable or unobservable. Their 
existence is judged by a causal rather than a perceptual criteria – i.e., that they have 
causal effects in the world.  
• Mechanisms are relatively enduring in respect of the events that they cause but their 
absolute timescale may vary immensely. They have powers or tendencies, by virtue of 
their structural properties, to behave in particular ways or have certain effects. These 
powers may not be exercised all the time (perhaps needing to be triggered), or they may 
be exercised but have no effect because of the countervailing actions of some other 
mechanism. Through their interactions, mechanisms generate the actual occurrences and 
events of the world, only some of which are observed or noted empirically (Bhaskar 
1979, p. 170). Thus a mechanism may be said to consist of a structure of inter-related 
parts together with the powers or tendencies that the structure possesses. 
• Social structures or mechanisms have different properties or characteristics to physical 
ones (Bhaskar 1979). First, they only become manifest at all through the activities that 
they govern. That is, social structures cannot be directly observed, they exist only 
virtually as a set of practices or roles which govern or enable social activities – think of 
language as an example. Through these activities the structures become reproduced or 
indeed changed and transformed. Second, they rely to some degree on the knowledge and 
understanding of social actors who must be aware that they are doing a particular activity, 
and how to do it. Third, they are localised in time and space in the sense that they belong 
to particular cultures at particular times rather than being universal, apart perhaps from 
extremely general ones such as the human ability to use tools or language. Finally, social 
systems are inevitably open (rather than being able to be closed as in a laboratory 
experiment) and hence, in principle unpredictable. 
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We should also point out, and it will be discussed more later, that critical realism stresses the 
importance of the negative/absent as well as the positive/present as causally efficacious 
(Bhaskar 1993). 
Parts, wholes and boundaries: the basis of systemic thinking 
Systems thinking can be traced back to the Greeks, but in modern times it developed in the 
early twentieth century in fields such as biology, ecology and the then new discipline of 
cybernetics (the study of information and control in natural and man-made systems)2. The 
basic systemic insight is the anti-reductionist one that parts interact together to form wholes 
which have properties or powers that are emergent in that they cannot be reduced or 
explained purely in terms of the properties of the elements (Winther 2009). They only occur 
at the level of the system as a whole. Early biological organicists actually used the term 
‘system’ and it was perhaps best articulated in Woodger’s (1929) Biological Principles. 
Similar ideas developed in the Gestalt school of psychology (Wertheimer and King 2005), 
and ecology (Haeckel 1866, von Uexkull 1909), and even atomic physics, a bastion of 
reductionism, began to recognise wholeness at the very fundamental levels of subatomic 
particles which were not so much discrete particles but webs of interacting forces 
(Heisenberg 1963). 
The central systemic idea – that the characteristics and behaviour of entities depended on the 
structure of relationships between components rather than the properties of the components 
themselves – carries with it several other concepts – emergence, hierarchy and boundaries. 
With emergence comes hierarchy. If we consider a system at a particular level it consists of 
components and relations. However, each component can itself be treated as a system and 
‘opened up’ to reveal another set of components and relations. This process can in principle 
go on for an indefinite number of levels until we reach the bedrock of indissoluble forces. We 
can also go in the other direction from the initial system and see that it is only a component of 
a further hierarchy of wider systems. 
The third concept is that of boundary. If emergent properties are attributed to a particular 
entity in virtue of its components and relations we must be able to demarcate the system that 
has the properties from its environment. This may seem relatively clear when we are dealing 
with physically discrete objects that have a single clear boundary, but becomes much more 
contentious when dealing with complex systems that may be physically diffuse; that may 
consist of different types of components some of which may not actually be physical (e.g., 
information or ideas); and above all when we deal with social systems (Mingers 2006b, Ch. 
4). 
Going beyond the structural aspects of systems, one of the founders of the systems movement 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950) developed the concept of open systems as opposed to the 
closed systems of the laboratory, and also established general systems theory (GST). based on 
the recognition that the systems concepts and principles we have described can be applied 
                                                 
2 Good sources for overviews of the history of systems are Capra (1997),  Checkland (1981), Hayles (1999), and 




irrespective of the particular nature or substance of the systems concerned. It is therefore 
possible to study systems relationships and organisations in the abstract and then apply them, 
as with mathematics, to particular domains.  
Another major development was an entirely new discipline – cybernetics – the science of 
communication and control. The early cyberneticians, Weiner (1948), von Neumann (1958), 
Shannon (1949) and McCulloch (1943), were mainly mathematicians and engineers who 
were interested in the ways in which systems, both mechanical and biological, regulated and 
controlled themselves in a largely automatic way (Tamburrini and Datteri 2005). They 
recognised that the key to this was the concepts of information and feedback. Working 
initially on the design of self-controlling weapons, the ideas soon spread into modelling the 
functioning of the brain (Ashby 1952), developing the first digital computers (von Neumann 
1958), anthropology (Bateson 1936) and psychiatry (Bateson 1973). Systems concepts were 
also applied extensively in sociology, for example Parsons (1951) whose work was criticised 
for being overly functionalist; Buckley (Buckley 1967) who emphasised the dynamic and 
processual aspects of systems; and Habermas (1987). 
Finally, an important realisation that came out of quantum physics, again in opposition to the 
prevailing positivist view of science, was the inevitable involvement of the observer in any 
observations or descriptions that we make of the world. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle 
showed that the results we might get could not be simply reflections of the external world 
alone but were always in part due to the very act of observation. As Heisenberg (1963, p. 75) 
put it, ‘Natural science does not simply describe and explain nature … it describes nature as 
exposed to our method of questioning’. As we shall see, it is very much one of the important 
planks of systems thinking that the observer must be recognised as part of the system. This 
foreshadowed the development in the 1970’s of what we might call interpretive systems 
thinking, based on the insights of phenomenology and interpretive sociology, and known as 
2nd order cybernetics (Maturana and Varela 1980) or soft systems thinking (Checkland 
1981)3.  
Issues in mechanistic explanation 
Illari and Williamson (2011) provide a useful overview of some of the issues involved in the 
philosophy of mechanistic explanation and we will use it to structure this section in which we 
try to show that systems thinking and critical realism can shed some light on these problems. 
The nature of mechanistic explanation 
Mechanistic explanation is clearly in contrast to the covering law model for several good 
reasons, and this has been one of the main arguments of CR against various forms of 
positivism and empiricism (Bhaskar 1978, Groff 2011). Positivism, in the form of the D-N 
model of explanation and resting on a Humean view of causality, involves a double 
reduction. It firstly reduces the domain of the real - enduring entities and structures that have 
causal powers - to the domain of the actual – particular events that actually occur (ignoring 
absences, i.e., events that might have occurred but for some reason did not). And then, it 
                                                 
3 Some of the major systems works not referenced elsewhere are: Churchman (1968), Churchman (1971), 
Laszlo (1972), Weinberg (1975), Rapoport (1986), Klir (1991) and Open Systems Group (1981) 
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reduces the domain of the actual to that of the empirical, i.e., those events that happen to be 
observed and can be measured. From this impoverished base, it does no more than re-
describe the data in the form of a mathematical law, with no greater concept of causality than 
constant conjunctions of events (Craver 2006).  
In contrast, CR only begins with empirical observations, it then goes beneath the surface to 
try and explain what underlying mechanisms could, if they existed, produce the events that in 
fact occurred, or did not occur. CR has a stratified ontology – the real which consists of 
enduring mechanisms and structures, including human beings and social systems; the actual 
which are the events caused or precluded by the interacting mechanisms, and which 
themselves of course can have causal effects; and the empirical which is the subset of the 
actual experienced and observed by human beings. Bhaskar supports this view both on 
logical (transcendental) grounds that we will discuss later, and more pragmatic ones that echo 
those philosophers supporting a mechanistic approach. In particular that this properly 
provides an explanation for events rather than simply a redescription for them (Glennan 
2002); that it accords with the actual practices of scientists (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005); 
and, again to be discussed later, that general or universal laws do not exist in many domains, 
especially the social sciences (Cartwright 1983). Chakravartty (2005) defends this view 
against several long-standing objections. 
Illari and Williamson suggest that a second aspect of mechanistic explanation is a distinction 
in the literature between epistemic and ontic types of explanations. Salmon (1998b) originally 
drew this distinction suggesting that an epistemic form of explanation, such as that of Hempel 
(1965), was essentially an inferential argument to the effect that the events to be explained 
were to be expected given general laws and the initial conditions. On the other hand, an ontic 
explanation (sometimes called a physical explanation) is one which shows how the events 
have resulted from causal patterns and regularities. These may be of two types – constitutive, 
where the events result from the properties of a specific mechanism, and etiological where 
they are the outcome of a chain of events. More generally, an epistemic explanation is 
motivated by a desire to improve human understanding, and is therefore constrained by the 
knowledge and understanding of the audience. An ontic explanation concerns the actual 
causal mechanism and its effects whether or not it is properly understood. A similar 
distinction has been made between actual mechanisms in the world, and the scientists’ 
descriptions and models of that mechanism (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, Glennan 2002, 
Machamer, et al. 2000). As Illari and Williamson (2011, p. 823, my emphasis) say, “These 
differences exist because in the epistemic sense of explanation it is the description of the 
mechanism that explains, while in the physical sense, the mechanism itself does the 
explaining.”  
This distinction can be seen as part of a wider differentiation made by Bhaskar concerning 
what he calls the transitive (epistemic) and intransitive (ontic) dimensions of science 
(Bhaskar 1979, Ch. 1). It has long been argued, especially from within the sociology of 
science, that science is a human activity or practice much like any other, and therefore the 
results of science reflect such human practices as much as they do the object world. This 
argument can be taken to have significant sceptical conclusions, for example in the “strong” 
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sociology of knowledge programme (Bloor 1976) or various forms of post-modernism. 
Bhaskar accepts that indeed much of science is a human activity or production, which he calls 
the transitive dimension, but maintains strongly that there is also in intransitive dimension to 
science which consists of the objects of knowledge that are independent of us, or at least of 
how we describe or know them.  
Thus, the transitive dimension involves all the human activity of producing knowledge or, 
perhaps better, transforming previously existing knowledge, and is therefore inevitably local, 
temporal and partial. We have to accept that knowledge can never be perfect, or even be 
“proved” to be correct. It is always fallible or epistemically relative but this does not mean 
that all theories are equal, or that there are not rational grounds for choosing between them. 
One reason for this is precisely the externality or ontological independence of the objects of 
knowledge in the intransitive domain. Such objects do not have to be physical, but can be 
social, cognitive or even linguistic. An academic paper is produced in the transitive 
dimension but, once published, becomes an intransitive object of knowledge able to be 
discussed or referenced. 
Bhaskar also has a multivalent model of truth which is relevant in this context (Bhaskar 1993, 
Mingers 2008). This involves four levels or degrees of truthfulness. The lowest level 
(normative-fiduciary) is when one simply accepts the truth of what someone says on the 
grounds that they are a reliable or knowledgeable person who should “know” what they are 
talking about (e.g., a scientist or expert). Clearly this is very common in everyday life. The 
second level (adequating) is truth that is based on sound evidence or justification of some 
kind rather than mere belief. Both these levels are in the transitive domain, and thus relate to 
the epistemic approach above. The third level (referential-expressive) is like a weak 
correspondence theory relating theories or models in the transitive domain to their intransitive 
objects.  
The final level (alethic) is somewhat controversial (Groff 2000) for it moves the truthmaker 
entirely into the intransitive domain. There is no longer a correspondence between different 
domains, for it is the truth of things in themselves, and their generative causes, rather than the 
truth of propositions. It is no longer tied to language, i.e., it is no longer necessarily linguistic, 
although it may be expressed in language. It seems to be very akin to the ontic view of 
explanation that Illari and McKay described above. One could perhaps say that the 
experience of toothache generates its own alethic truth – we do not need to describe it or 
compare it with something else, we merely experience it to know its truth. 
The reality of mechanisms 
It may seem obvious, but if mechanisms are to be the core of scientific explanation, then it is 
necessary that mechanisms be “real”, that is, at least some must have an independent 
existence and be responsible for the phenomena that they explain. Clearly there are extreme 
sceptical arguments that would question whether we can take anything to exist, including 
ourselves – the age old argument addressed by Descartes and Husserl. We will not consider 
those but there are nevertheless important issues that need to be addressed, particularly the 
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debate over “theoretical entities”, and the possibility of non-physical mechanisms such as 
social and cognitive systems.  
First, theoretical entities – committed positivists and empiricists denied the legitimacy of 
unobservable, theoretical entities within scientific theories on the grounds that they were not 
observable or measurable, and so could not be assumed to exist. This is to adopt a 
perceptability criterion for existence. It is clearly against the practices of working scientists, 
who routinely hypothesise the existence of unobservable mechanisms and then set about 
trying to observe them or their traces (witness the billions spent on the search for the Higgs 
boson), and it is clearly against the possibility of mechanisms in the non-physical domain. 
Bhaskar (Archer, et al. 1998, Bhaskar 1978, Bhaskar 1989) has proposed several arguments 
against this view, and the related Humean view of causation as constant conjunctions of 
events. The main form of argument, which is also employed in a slightly different way by 
Cartwright (1999), is a transcendental argument a la Kant.  
Transcendental arguments (Stern 2000) take the form:  
Premise 1: There is something, X, that we experience or agree about. 
Premise 2: X could not be experienced if Y were not the case. 
Conclusion: Y must be the case. 
 
For Bhaskar, the X that we experience and agree on is experimental scientific activity (within 
natural science), both its successes and failures. In conducting a laboratory experiment we, 
scientists, bring about (or fail to bring about) a particular effect under certain controlled 
conditions. Effectively, we engineer constant conjunctions of events which do not, in fact, 
happen regularly at all. Then, however, we find that these effects can also be brought about 
outside of the lab, in open rather than closed conditions. For this to happen it must be the case 
that (Y) causal laws are more than simply constant conjunctions – there must in fact be 
enduring structures or mechanisms that are distinct from the events they generate, and occur 
both inside and outside the laboratory.  
“On this view, laws are not empirical statements but statements about the forms of 
activity characteristic of the things of the world. And their necessity is that of a natural 
connection, not that of a human rule” Bhaskar, in Archer (1998, p. 34). 
Clarke (2010) analyses the transcendental arguments of both Bhaskar and Cartwright 
concluding that while neither succeeds entirely, neither should be rejected out of hand. 
Bhaskar himself developed some of his ideas from previous work by Harré and Madden 
(Harre and Madden 1975) on the notion of causal powers4 and it is also possible to relate it to 
the Aristotelian approach to causality (Pratten 2009). 
The second issue concerns the reality of non-physical mechanisms such as social, 
psychological or informational systems. In fact, most of the philosophical literature on 
                                                 




mechanisms restricts itself very much to the natural sciences such as biology and chemistry 
but the ontology of social structures has always been highly contentious in social science 
(Mingers 2004). We cannot cover such a debate here but we will highlight three related 
issues: i) whether we can accept non-physical and non-observable mechanisms (or systems, 
or structures) as having ontological reality; ii) whether there are social structures or 
mechanisms over and above the actions of individual people; and iii) whether the dependence 
of social mechanisms on peoples’ understanding of them somehow compromises their reality. 
For critical realism, the answer is clearly yes to the first two and no to the third (Bhaskar 
1979, Bhaskar 1989, Bhaskar 1997).  
i) CR utilises a causal criterion for existence and a transcendental argument, as discussed 
above. Entities do not have to be physical or directly observable to be real; they only have to 
be causally efficacious. This means that concepts, ideas, rules and social practices, for 
instance, are no less real for being unobservable. We can also apply the transcendental 
argument to social structures. Our experiences of the social world cannot be explained purely 
in terms of individual actions – it must be the case that there are social mechanisms in 
operation that exist before, and over and above, particular individuals, and that necessarily 
enable our social activities. Some obvious examples are: language, the banking system and 
the use of money more generally, or the legal system. Considering language, it is something 
that pre-dates us, that we have to learn in childhood, and yet it then enables us to 
communicate with people we have never met. It is, in a general sense, a human construction 
for it would not exist without us, and yet none of us individually can change or develop it. 
For these experiences to occur it must be the case that language exists as an unobservable 
structure or mechanism separate from its embodiment in individual’s nervous systems, or its 
instantiations in actual language use.  
ii) For Bhaskar, society exists as an object in its own right, emergent from, but separate to, 
people and their activities, and with its own properties. Society always pre-exists individuals 
who do not therefore create it but only transform or (re)produce it. Nevertheless, society is 
necessary for social activity and it only exists in virtue of that activity. Society therefore 
conditions social activity and is either maintained or changed as an outcome of that activity. 
Equally, human action (praxis) is both a conscious production, i.e., intentional bringing about 
of purposes, and an unconscious (re)production of society. Society is an “ensemble” of 
structures, practices and conventions, where structures are relatively enduring generative 
mechanisms that govern social activities. Whilst emphasising the ontological reality of social 
structures, Bhaskar recognises that they have significantly different properties from physical 
mechanisms as was mentioned above. In particular: i) Social mechanisms do not exist 
independently of the activities they govern. ii) Social mechanisms cannot be empirically 
identified except through activities. iii) Social mechanisms are not independent of actors’ 
conceptions of their activity. iv) Social mechanisms are localised to particular times and 
cultures. Despite these differences they are still suitable subjects for scientific theorising even 
if they lead to particular epistemological difficulties. The explicit use of “mechanism” as an 
explanatory device is growing in social science, see, for example, in history Steinmetz 
(1998), in organizational research Anderson et al (2006) and in politics Gerring (2007). 
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iii) A third issue raised by Illari and Williamson (2011) is that many of the writers on 
mechanisms (e.g., (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, Craver 2007, Darden 2006, Glennan 
2002)) presume that they must fulfil some function within a wider system so that a 
mechanistic explanation must be a functionalist explanation. This is problematic partly 
because of the long-standing debate about the validity of functionalist explanation, especially 
in the social sciences (Salmon 1998a), but also because the specification of a function would 
seem to depend on a description of the wider system which may in turn depend on the 
perspective of the observer.  
Our view is that insisting that mechanisms must fulfil some function in order to be a 
mechanism is neither necessary nor legitimate outside of the domain of humanly-designed 
systems. Certainly modern systems theorists do not accept it. For example, the biologist and 
neurophysiologist Humberto Maturana (1970, 1975), who developed the concept of 
autopoiesis (self-producing systems) to explain the fundamental nature of living entities, was 
clear that his use of mechanistic explanation was non-teleological; as was Antony Giddens 
(1984) with his concept of structuration as a theory of the reproduction of social systems. 
Mechanisms arise historically through some particular chain of events, perhaps involving 
chance. They have effects, and it may well be that these effects, often in combination with the 
effects of other mechanisms, may give rise to behaviour that is self-sustaining or contributes 
to a wider system (another mechanism at a higher level). In this sense, they may be seen, 
after the event and by an observer, to play some functional role. However, the actual 
operation of the mechanism still occurs in terms of its own structure and local interactions: 
“The organization of a machine, … only states relations between components and 
rules for their interactions and transformations, in a manner that specifies the 
conditions of emergence of the different states of the machine which, then, arise as a 
necessary outcome whenever such conditions occur. Thus the notions of purpose and 
function have no explanatory value in the phenomenological domain which they 
pretend to illuminate” (Maturana and Varela 1980, p. 86). 
Not only is functionalist explanation unnecessary, but it may be incorrect since mechanisms 
may have effects which are dysfunctional or non-functional as far as some wider system is 
concerned. Obvious examples are cancerous cells or insurgency, both of which are still the 
result of organised mechanisms. So it is right and proper to characterise mechanisms in terms 
of their components, relationships and emergent powers and properties, and then observe 
their behaviour in interaction with other kinds of mechanisms. The issue about a mechanism 
playing different roles in different systems will be discussed in the section on localisation. 
Must mechanisms be local? 
If we move, now, to the actual nature of mechanistic explanations, or more precisely the 
nature of the mechanisms that are postulated in such explanations, we find another potential 
problem in the literature – that such mechanisms are generally said to be “local” in a spatio-
temporal sense (Bechtel 2001, Craver 2007, Hall 2004). Illari and Williamson (2011) identify 
three possible difficulties – the functional individuation of mechanisms; the existence of non-
physical mechanisms; and omissions or absences, but still conclude that “it is a genuine 
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feature of mechanisms that they are local” (p. 833). The argument of this section, from a 
system perspective, is that whilst many mechanisms (especially physical ones) are indeed 
local, in a physical space sense, it is not a necessary characteristic of a mechanism. Rather, a 
mechanism or system operates within a state space dependent on the characteristics of its 
constituting components, which may or may not be physical. 
There seems to be a general agreement amongst those advocating mechanistic explanation 
(e.g., (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005, Gillett 2007, Glennan 1996, Wimsatt 1994, Woodward 
2002) that the postulated mechanisms are what we have called above “systems”, i.e., groups 
of component parts (or mechanisms) that interact together to create a particular effect or 
phenomenon which is to be explained. They generally form hierarchies, with emergent 
properties at each new level. The implication of this conception, particularly in the case of 
physical phenomena which is what most of these authors discuss, is that the mechanism and 
its effects are localised in a physical sense. The size of the locality is hugely variable, from 
quantum to astronomical scale.  
From a systems viewpoint, we would translate the idea of localisation into one of boundary. 
In order to identify a system (or mechanism, using the two equivalently) we need to 
distinguish what elements constitute the system as opposed to its environment, and this 
means specifying the system’s boundary. This is not a straightforward task because of the 
variety of different types of system, as can be seen from the following points from Mingers 
(2006a). 
A boundary is that which separates or demarcates that which is part of a system from that 
which is not. It may be physical or non-physical, actual or conceptual. In the case of physical 
systems, we can distinguish: 
• Edges and surfaces that are the limit or extent of a system, e.g., a pool of water 
• Enclosures, where there are specific boundary components that keep in that which is 
included, and/or keep out that which is excluded, e.g., a football or a fence or a 
membrane such as the cell wall. 
• Demarcations, where the system is physical but not necessarily contiguous in space, 
e.g., the solar system or a central heating system 
In general, systems can be conceptualised in different ways, generating different boundaries; 
and the components of a system may be part of multiple systems. For example, a central 
heating system could be conceptualised as a flow of water system (pipes, radiators, valves, 
water supply), a flow of energy system (gas, boiler, water, air), or a flow of information  
system (difference between actual and desired temperature, difference in thermostat setting, 
difference in degree of heating). 
These examples show that systemic thinking involves more than the simple recognition of 
individual objects. It begins with a particular phenomenon to be explained or purpose to be 
achieved. It then requires a degree of conceptualisation, rather than mere perception, on the 
part of an observer to characterise an appropriate system in terms of components, relations 
and boundary. The boundary may in part have a material embodiment but generally it will 
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simply represent a distinction or demarcation between that which has been selected as part of 
the system and that which is not. This does not mean that the boundary is purely arbitrary, or 
is wholly a construction of the observer. It rests on the components and relations that exist 
independently in the intransitive domain even though it is selected by the observer. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that the observer may get it wrong. Knowledge is always fallible 
and the real world will soon let us know if our choices of components, relations and 
boundaries do not in fact yield the appropriate behaviour. 
So far we have considered primarily physical systems where the idea of spatial localisation 
may be seen to be necessary, although even there non-physical elements such as information 
are often involved. However, as we move away towards conceptual or social systems we 
need to characterise them in terms of the space of interactions of the system itself, which may 
well not be physical space.  
Let us consider as an example the nervous system as a system (or mechanism) in its own 
right, separate from although obviously part of, a body (Maturana 1970, Maturana 1980, 
Maturana, et al. 1995, Varela 1991). An organism without a nervous system, such as amoeba, 
acts in response to chemical changes in its immediate, local, environment. Its outer wall is 
essentially both its sensory and effector surfaces. However, in the nervous system cells have 
become specialised in two particular ways: first, they have developed lengthy extensions 
called dendrites that connect them to many other, sometimes distant, neurons. This leads to a 
separation of sensor from effector and the possibility of a transmission of difference or 
disturbance. Second, they have developed a generalised response medium – electrical activity 
– into which all forms of sensory/effector interactions can be translated. A third development 
is that of internal neurons that only connect to other neurons, and form the vast majority of 
developed brains. These effectively sever the direct connection between sensor and effector 
and are the basis for cognition, language and ultimately self-consciousness.  
The effect of this is that the development of the nervous system opens up a whole new 
domain of interactions beyond the purely local physico-chemical ones of amoeba. They allow 
the organism to interact with the relations or differences between events, rather than simply 
with the events themselves. Neurons develop that are only triggered by particular 
combinations of other neurons, which represent particular configurations within the 
environment. Thus, although the nervous system is a physical system, and does have physical 
interactions, its domain of interactions as a nervous system, is states of relative neuronal 
activity triggered by relations and differences in its environment and acting back on that 
environment. Such interactions cannot be localised to the brain. For example, in a mobile 
phone conversation with someone physically distant, differences in sound are transmitted 
through the phone system to differences in sound at the receiver, differences in brain activity, 
differences in sound etc. etc. The whole forms a system in which spatial location is not a 
necessary or defining feature. This view is related to theories such as radical enactivism 
(Menary 2006) and the extended mind (Clark and Chalmers 1998). 
The nature and boundaries of other non-physical systems, especially social systems, is 
controversial, and we do not have the space to discuss it here (Archer 1995, Bhaskar 1979, 
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Giddens 1984, Luhmann 1995, Mingers 2002, Mingers 2004), but we will just give one 
illustration. It is very common in the commercial world to talk about the “market 
mechanism” as a particular type of economic process and we would argue that it can, indeed, 
be seen as a social or economic mechanism. It is a particular form of (largely unregulated or 
controlled) trading where buyers and sellers interact fairly directly, and prices change in 
response to the balance between supply and demand. Historically, this mechanism actually 
did operate locally in a physical market, located in space and time, and lasting for a certain 
duration. However, today we can see that trading, especially in financial or commodity 
markets, is highly attenuated being conducted electronically throughout the world and 24 
hours per day. It does not make sense to talk about its locality, but it is still important to 
delineate the boundaries of such a system – i.e., what constitutes the system and what 
constitutes its environment even if the answer may depend in part on the observer and their 
purpose.     
Absences and omissions as causes 
Finally, in this section we shall discuss the question of omissions or more generally absences 
as causal elements of mechanisms. Illari and Williamson (2011) suggest that absences may be 
a problem for mechanistic explanation on the grounds that they may not be local, a condition 
that they consider necessary as discussed in the previous section. Torres (2009) proposes a 
revision to the mechanistic models of Glennan (1996) and Machamer et al (2000) to more 
properly account for negative or absent causes. 
We have already argued above that we do not consider localisation as a necessary condition 
for a mechanism, and so we do not consider the fact that absences sometimes cannot be 
localised to be a problem. Rather, we would argue strongly that varieties of absence often lie 
at the heart of causal mechanisms, and both critical realism and systems thinking, particularly 
cybernetics, supports this view.  
In terms of CR, as Bhaskar developed his ideas towards the dialectical version in Dialectic: 
The Pulse of Freedom (Bhaskar 1993), he came to see absence as more and more important, 
indeed ultimately as more significant that presence. Against the prevailing worldview that 
deals only with what positively occurs or exists (especially in positivism and empiricism), 
Bhaskar maintains that it is the absent or the negative which has priority for it is only against 
this that the positive stands out or happens. Bhaskar suggests four categories of absence: i) 
simple or ontological absence, i.e., that some thing or event that is expected does not occur or 
does not exist. Such absences can have causal effect and therefore ‘exist’ in the same way as 
other things. He calls them ‘de-onts’. The instrument that is not to hand, the bill that is 
unpaid, or the appointment that is missed all have causal effects5. ii) Absence as a verb, 
which could be absenting something or negating something, e.g., draining water or removing 
dirt; or which could be absenting an absence, e.g., removing a need or want by fulfilling it. 
Developing from these two are: iii) ‘process-in-product’, whereby a process (e.g., shopping) 
leads to an absence (e.g., money in the bank); and iv) product-in-process whereby an entity or 
                                                 
5 It is important that the absence must have been expected or must normally occur, for it to be significant. At any 
instant there is an infinity of things that are not happening but the majority are not in any sense relevant. That I 
am not at the bus stop at this moment is of no importance if I was not intending to be. 
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structure (e.g., poverty, lack of money) exercises its powers in producing an absence 
(necessities of life). 
This is interesting from a systems thinking point of view because it is not something that is 
generally discussed or considered in the modern literature and yet is clearly of great 
importance. In fact, its significance was recognised by some: it can be seen as the basis of 
cybernetic explanation as Bateson, one of the founders of cybernetics, observed:  
“Causal explanation is usually positive. ... In contrast to this, cybernetic explanation is 
always negative. We consider what alternative possibilities could conceivably have 
occurred and then ask why were many of the alternatives not followed, so that the 
particular event was one of those few which could, in fact, occur.” (Bateson 1973, p. 
375) 
A similar idea is at the heart of Luhmann’s (1990) theory of social communication in which a 
message acts as a trigger or selector from among the many responses or replies that could be 
generated – it selects that which is presenced from among all the other absent possibilities. 
We can also see the importance of absence in the idea of control by feedback. The feedback 
system (e.g., a thermostat) is always trying to close a gap (absent an absence) between the 
desired state of the system and the actual state of the system (Wilden 1977).  
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate that many of the issues and debates within 
the recent philosophy of causal mechanisms have already been much discussed within the 
literatures of critical realism and systems thinking. And, moreover, that the conclusions 
reached there may well be useful in the philosophical discourse about mechanisms.  
After a very brief review of the literatures of critical realism and systems thinking, a range of 
issues concerning mechanisms were discussed. In particular, it was argued that: 
• We need to distinguish between the events that occur (and do not occur) that are to be 
explained (the actual) and the underlying, enduring structures and mechanisms (the 
real) that, through the operation of their powers in interaction, causally generate these 
events. We should also distinguish between the transitive domain of science (which is 
epistemic) in which theories and knowledge is humanly produced, and the intransitive 
domain of the independent objects of our knowledge (which is ontic). 
• We can accept the reality of mechanisms (or systems more generally) may be non-
physical and/or non-observable. The ontological criterion should not be perceptability 
but causal efficaciousness. Thus, social mechanisms (e.g., “society”), informational 
mechanisms (driven be information), or cognitive mechanisms (e.g., ideas or motives) 
all have causal effects and may thus be part of explanatory theories. 
• Mechanistic explanation does not have to be a form of functionalist explanation. 
• Mechanisms do not have to be localised in a purely physical sense although they need 
to be bounded, or able to be demarcated, within their space of interactions. 
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• Absences and omissions may be causes and thus may legitimately be part of 
mechanistic explanations. 
This paper has only been able to skim the surface of the many possible connections between 
mechanistic explanation and systems thinking and critical realism, but this will hopefully 
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